



Director of
Central
Intelligence

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031200010002-2

Top Secret

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National Intelligence Daily

Thursday
1 March 1979

DIA review(s) completed.

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
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
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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the *Daily*, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

VIETNAM: Reaction to World Opinion

Despite China's invasion, world public opinion has not turned in Vietnam's favor as Hanoi had hoped. The Vietnamese are now reacting by adopting a "for-us-or-against-us" attitude that may only increase Hanoi's isolation. [REDACTED]


Vietnam expected the Chinese invasion to change its image overnight from aggressor in Kampuchea to victim of aggression. Most countries, however, have attempted to remain neutral in the Chinese-Vietnamese conflict and to balance criticism of China's invasion with Vietnam's in Kampuchea. Even the Japanese Communist Party, which is sympathetic, offered only lukewarm support for a Hanoi-backed international conference to criticize China. [REDACTED]

Support for Vietnam has come almost entirely from the USSR and its East European allies. India has reiterated its traditional support, even though this could set back efforts to improve relations with China. Italian Communist Party leader Berlinguer's endorsement of Hanoi last week apparently had more to do with intra-party politics than a strong commitment to Vietnam. Hanoi itself has played down Soviet support, lest it appear to be the Soviet puppet China says it is. [REDACTED]

Vietnam seems to be particularly upset by the US and Thai response to China's invasion. The Vietnamese media have repeatedly charged the US with acquiescence if not complicity in the Chinese attack. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Vietnam is beginning to note openly in its press that Thailand is assisting China in resupplying the Pol Pot forces. [REDACTED]

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The Vietnamese are clearly determined to see the situation through, even without widespread support. Vietnam continues to express confidence that it can meet the limited military threat China is posing and has steadfastly refused to negotiate until all Chinese forces withdraw. [REDACTED]

Vietnam also remains opposed to any political solution that would link a Chinese withdrawal to a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea. Indeed, the Vietnamese media convey a sense of righteousness--often in belligerent terms--when discussing Kampuchea and Vietnam's "legitimate" role as the leader of the Indochinese people. [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

EGYPT: Armed Forces Look Abroad

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Senior Egyptian military officials may alter the structure and purpose of their armed forces following a peace treaty with Israel. Clearly worried about US resolve in countering Communist expansion in Africa and the Middle East, they want to create forces suitable for intervention in the area--primarily to counter Soviet and other Communist influence. Events in Iran may lead the Egyptians to act more forcefully in the future. Moreover, by stressing Communist influence in Africa and a readiness to combat it, the Egyptians probably hope to spur the US to provide them additional arms and equipment. During Defense Secretary Brown's recent visit to Cairo, the Egyptians couched their requests for sophisticated weapons in terms of their anti-Communist policy.

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Senior Egyptian officials--particularly President Sadat--are concerned about Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa and the Middle East. Chief of Staff Badawi told the US Army attache in Cairo in December that Egypt, under former President Nasir, had let the Soviets into the area, and it is now Egypt's duty to oppose them, for both ideological and security reasons. The Egyptians consider Libya under President Qadhafi to be a hostile state with a vast array of military equipment that could be used by the Soviets or Cubans against them. Egyptian officials probably view any Communist successes in Africa and the Middle East as increasing that threat.

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
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The senior officials' concerns about Soviet and Cuban influence are not shared by younger officers, many of whom see the period after a peace treaty as one in which Egypt should concentrate on economic development. They fear that Sadat will pursue a more active military policy in Africa and the Middle East and do not wish "to die for Somalia." Even some senior officers and officials, whose memories of Egypt's disastrous involvement in Yemen in the 1960s are still fresh, would be opposed to a more active military policy abroad. 

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

Saudi Arabia - Palestinians

The Saudi News Agency reported that Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat conferred in Riyadh yesterday with Saudi King Khalid, Crown Prince Fahd, Foreign Minister Saud, and several other cabinet ministers. Arafat is currently on a tour of Persian Gulf states. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: *The border fighting between North and South Yemen was probably the principal topic of discussion. Arafat has in the past served as a mediator in disputes between the two Yemens.* [REDACTED]

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Rhodesia-Mozambique


A Rhodesian military communique today announced that Rhodesian jets bombed a Mozambican Army camp also used by guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union. All the aircraft returned safely; no results of the raid were announced. Western news services say the military camp is located 250 kilometers from the Rhodesian border, where the Mozambique-Malawi railroad crosses the Zambesi River. 

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COMMENT: *If press reports are accurate, the raid would be one of the deepest Rhodesian penetrations to date into Mozambican territory.* 

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Zambia


Nationalist guerrillas of Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union mistakenly shot down two Zambian military aircraft on Monday and Tuesday inside Zambia, according to press reports. The airplanes were hit by ground fire from the ZAPU camps northwest of Lusaka that were bombed by the Rhodesians last Friday; the guerrillas evidently believed they were once again under attack. 

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


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


Canada-US

Canada's National Energy Board gave the go-ahead yesterday to a 28-percent increase in natural gas exports to the US, after concluding that Canada had a surplus of about 2 trillion cubic feet of gas that could be exported over the next eight years. A senior vice president of Shell Canada described the Energy Board's estimate of the exportable surplus as "conservative." He predicted that further hearings would produce evidence of greater gas reserves and that yesterday's findings would constitute only a first step toward increasing exports.



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